Rethinking The Lord Chancellor’s Role In Judicial Appointments by Gee, G.D.
This is a repository copy of Rethinking The Lord Chancellor’s Role In Judicial 
Appointments.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/118046/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Gee, G.D. (2017) Rethinking The Lord Chancellor’s Role In Judicial Appointments. Legal 
Ethics, 20 (1). pp. 4-20. ISSN 1460-728X 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728x.2017.1345085
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 
 
 1 
(7+,1.,1*7+(/25'&+$1&(//25·652/(,1-8',&,$/
APPOINTMENTS 
  
Graham Gee* 
  
  
The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. 
The pre-2005 appointments regime conferred excessive discretion on the 
Lord Chancellor, but the post-2005 regime has gone much too far in the 
opposite direction. Today, the Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded 
from the process of selecting lower level judges and enjoys only limited 
say over the selection of senior judges. In this article I argue that the 
current regime places too little weight on the sound reasons for involving 
the minister in individual selection decisions, including the scope for 
ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply political 
leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the Lord 
&KDQFHOORULQWKHGLVFKDUJHRIWKHRIILFH·VV\VWHPLFUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUDWWKH
Lord Chancellor. I argue that shortlists reconcile the need to more fully 
involve the Lord Chancellor whilst at the same time ensuring that 
candidates satisfy a merit threshold. 
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5(7+,1.,1*7+(/25'&+$1&(//25·S ROLE IN JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 
 
Graham Gee* 
 
Introduction 
 
What role ought the Lord Chancellor to perform in judicial appointments? 
Until relatively recently, judicial appointments in England and Wales were 
almost entirely organised around the Lord Chancellor, a historic office that 
in its twentieth-century guise mixed significant ministerial, legislative and 
MXGLFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV 6XEMHFW WR WDNLQJ ¶VHFUHW VRXQGLQJV· ZLWK judges 
and barristers, and subject to minimal eligibility requirements laid down 
in statute, the Lord Chancellor had traditionally enjoyed the controlling 
hand when deciding whom to elevate to judicial office.1 However, the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 substantially reshaped the office of Lord 
Chancellor and, in doing so, shifted much of the responsibility for 
appointments to a new -XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQ¶-$&·2QHRI
the defining features of the post-2005 regime is that Lord Chancellors now 
have little discretion over individual appointment decisions. Today, the 
Lord Chancellor has no role in final selection decisions to lower courts and 
tribunals, which constitute 95 per cent of the judicial workforce, and his or 
her say over final selections to the senior courts is severely tempered by 
statute. Most judges and lawyers welcome the marginalisation of the Lord 
Chancellor. In this article I depart from the dominant view in the legal 
class to contend that the Lord Chancellor ought to have a greater say over 
senior vacancies (by which I mean appointments to the High Court, the 
Court of Appeal and leadership positions such as the Lord Chief Justice 
and Heads of Division).2  
 
There are four main and related reasons why it is important to reconsider 
WKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VOLPLWHGUROHLQLQGLYLGXDODSSRLQWPHQWV to the High 
Court and above. First, there has been little sustained attempt to elucidate 
and evaluate the reasons why Lord Chancellors should have a meaningful 
input into senior selection decisions. True, some academics have outlined a 
                                                        
* University of Sheffield.  
This article draws on confidential interviews conducted between 2011-14 with many actors involved in 
the judicial appointments process. These interviews formed part of a project funded by the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AH/H039554/1). They were augmented by interviews between 2015-17, 
VXSSRUWHGE\WKH6/6·5HVHDUFK$FWLYLWLHV)XQG8QDWWULEXWHGTXRWHVDUHIURPWKHVHLQWHUYLHZVI am 
grateful for comments from Sir Thomas Legg and the editors. 
1 See generally D. Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor (Hart 2001) 133-163. As I explain below, there 
was a gradual process of formalization during the latter period of the twentieth century, with the Lord 
Chancellor and officials consulting extensively and on a structured rolling programme with all levels of 
the judiciary and the senior bar.  
2 My focus in this article is exclusively on appointments in England and Wales, but my arguments apply 
to appointments to the UK Supreme Court as well.  
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number of reasons.3 Reference to such reasons can also be found in official 
publications such as consultation papers and the reports of parliamentary 
committees.4 But, without exception, these are no more than brief (and, in 
some cases, cursory) sketches of some of the main reasons for conferring 
more discretion on the Lord Chancellor. Absent from both the policy and 
academic debate is a close examination of the arguments in favour of more 
ministerial discretion. More particularly, there has been a lack of in-depth 
discussion of how these arguments might relate to judicial independence.5 
One consequence of this is that claims are made about the potential for an 
enhanced ministerial role to subvert judicial independence that ought not 
to withstand close scrutiny. Notably, many judges and lawyers argue that 
DQHQKDQFHGUROHIRUWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORUULVNV¶SROLWLFLsLQJ·DSSRLQWPHQWV
and by extension undermining judicial independence. Far from imperilling 
judicial independence, an enhanced role for the Lord Chancellor in final 
appointment decisions to senior roles offers an important way of nurturing 
that independence, or so I argue in this article. 
 
Second, a number of Lord Chancellors have expressed concern about their 
limited discretion in senior judicial appointments.6 This could be read as 
the wholly predictable complaints of ministers lamenting their lost powers 
of patronage. Alternatively, these concerns could be taken seriously, in the 
sense of triggering an investigation into just how much discretion over top 
appointments the Lord Chancellor actually enjoys in practice, and whether 
such discretion is sufficient. This would require not only close examination 
of how the selection process works in practice, but also the identification of 
some criteria to evaluate what constitutes a normatively desirable level of 
ministerial discretion over senior judicial vacancies. To date, beyond fuzzy 
references to judicial independence and democratic accountability, no such 
criteria have been articulated. Rather, most assessments of whether Lord 
Chancellors possess too much or too little discretion over senior selections 
rely on (at best) under-determined or (at worst) unarticulated assumptions 
about the proper role for a minister in senior appointments within a polity 
VXFKDVWKH8.·V,IWKHSULPDU\REMHFWLYHRIWKLVarticle is to make the case 
for enhanced discretion for the Lord Chancellor in senior appointments, a 
secondary objective is to elucidate the considerations that ought to inform 
                                                        
3 See, e.g., the brief discussion in **HH5+D]HOO.0DOOHVRQDQG32·%ULHQThe Politics of Judicial 
,QGHSHQGHQFHLQWKH8.·V&KDQJLQJ Constitution (CUP 2015) 186-187 and 192-193; and A. Paterson and C. 
Paterson, Guarding the Guardians: Towards an Independent, Accountable and Diverse Senior Judiciary 
(CentreForum 2012) 68-69 and 76-77. 
4 See, e.g., Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A New Way of Appointing Judges 
(2003) CP 10/2003 paras 19-26 and 42-52; Ministry of Justice, $SSRLQWPHQWVDQG'LYHUVLW\¶$Judiciary for 
the 21st &HQWXU\·(2012) CP 19/2011; and House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial 
Appointments (2012) HL 272 paras 21-37. 
5 7KHUHKDVEHHQPRUHDQDO\VLVRIMXGLFLDOLQIOXHQFHRQMXGLFLDODSSRLQWPHQWV6HHHJ**HH¶Judging 
WKH-$&+RZ0XFK-XGLFLDO,QIOXHQFH,V7RR0XFK"·LQ**HHDQG(5DFNOH\HGVDebating Judicial 
Appointments in an Age of Diversity (Routledge 2017) 152.  
6 J. Straw, $VSHFWVRI/DZ5HIRUP$Q,QVLGHU·V3HUVSHFWLYH (CUP 2013) 58-59. 
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IXWXUHGHEDWHVDERXWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VUROH As will become clear, one 
such consideration relates to the deep-seated diversity deficit that plagues 
the judiciary in England and Wales, which takes us to a third reason why it 
LVQHFHVVDU\WRUHFRQVLGHUWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VUROHLQVHQLRUVHOHFWLRQV  
 
Third, progress on diversifying the upper ranks of the judiciary remains 
painfully slow. Some progress has been made in appointing more women 
to the lower ranks during the first decade of the JAC-run selection regime. 
But progress in the senior ranks of the judiciary is extremely slow. Since 
2006, the number of women on the High Court and Court of Appeal has 
increased from 10 to 22 and two to eight respectively, but this represents 
only 21 per cent and 19 per cent of the number of judges on those courts.7 
The picture for British %ODFN$VLDQDQGPLQRULW\HWKQLF¶%$0(·MXGJHVLV
even more disturbing, with no BAME judges sitting on the Court of 
Appeal, and only two on the High Court.8 Senior leadership positions (the 
Lord Chief Justice, the Senior President of Tribunals and Heads of 
Division) continue to be dominated by white men. Most judges and 
lawyers do not attach much weight to the potential for an enhanced role 
for the Lord Chancellor to help address the diversity deficit, as neatly 
illustrated by a recent report on diversity by the law reform group 
JUSTICE that gives no consideration at all to the case for more ministerial 
discretion.9 Departing again from the dominant view in the legal 
community, I argue that more discretion for the Lord Chancellor can help 
to support the political will necessary to secure faster and more visible 
progress on diversifying the top judicial ranks. Growing concern across 
both the political and legal systems about the slow pace of progress in 
remedying the diversity deficit ensures that appointments are likely to 
remain on the policy agenda³and this overlaps with a final reason why it 
is important to rethink the Lord Chancellor·VUROH in senior selections.  
 
Finally, even aside from the need to address the diversity deficit, questions 
about WKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·V involvement in senior selections are likely to 
pierce the policy agenda over the next few years. Appointments have been 
a very unsettled sphere of public policy over the last ten years or so, with 
nine official reviews of the selection process between 2007 and 2017.10 Two 
opposing pressures are likely to operate in a pincer movement to push the 
/RUG&KDQFHOORU·Vrole to the fore. From one direction, judges and lawyers 
will press for the Lord Chancellor to be removed from appointments once 
                                                        
7 Judicial Office, Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin (Published 28 July 2016. 
Revised 2 December 2016) pp 6-7. 
8 Of the 3200 professional judges, ethnicity information is known for 84 per cent, with only 174 
declaring their background as BAME: Judicial Office, Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial Office 
Statistics Bulletin (Published 28 July 2016. Revised 2 December 2016) pp 8-9. 
9 See JUSTICE, Increasing Judicial Diversity (JUSTICE 2017). 
10 See Gee (n5).  
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and for all.11 There are several reasons for this, not least the fact that the 
legal community is increasingly dubious of the capacity and willingness of 
the politicians who occupy the reformed office of Lord Chancellor to serve 
as an effective guardian of judicial independence. The logical culmination 
of these doubts is to call for the Lord Chancellor to be deprived of any role 
in individual selection decisions. From a different direction, politicians 
concerned about the expansion of judicial power will chafe at the limited 
ministerial role in senior selections. The prospect of courts in England and 
Wales acquiring a new prominence after Brexit may provoke more intense 
political interest in the identity of those appointed to the top judicial ranks. 
More bluntly put: the Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
European Court of Human Rights have tended to be lightning rods for 
some of the harshest political critiques of judicial expansionism, with the 
domestic judiciary somewhat sheltered as a result. Removing the 
Luxembourg Court from the domestic legal landscape following Brexit, 
together with possible changes to the relationship between the Strasbourg 
Court and the domestic courts as part of long-touted reform to the Human 
Rights Act, is likely to ratchet up political interest in the identity of 
domestic judges. Part of the burden on this article is thus to explain why 
an enhanced role in appointments is a prudent response to this prospect. 
 
This article KDVWKUHHPDLQSDUWV,EHJLQE\PDSSLQJWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·V
involvement in the JAC-run selection regime. This is an inclusive regime, 
but the greater involvement of other actors in judicial appointments comes 
at the expense of the Lord Chancellor. For the central characteristic of the 
new selection regime is that the Lord Chancellor has been marginalised in 
both lower level and senior appointments, with influence shifting to senior 
judges instead. ,VNHWFKWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VLQYROYHPHQWLQORZHUDVZell 
as senior appointments in some detail since it is important to grasp the full 
H[WHQWRIWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VPDUJLQDOLsation across the selection regime 
as a whole. This marginalisation is clearest and most complete in respect of 
lower vacancies, but the largest and most vexing change has occurred in 
respect of senior selections. I spend some time discussing the appointment 
of Sir Nicholas Wall as President of the Family Division in 2010. Drawing 
on confidential interviews with several of those most closely involved in 
WKHVHOHFWLRQSURFHVV,VXJJHVWWKDW:DOO·VDSSRLQWPHQWLOOXVWUDWHVMXVWKRZ
little discretion Lord Chancellors now possess over individual selections to 
senior leadership roles. Next, I make the case for Lord Chancellors having 
more say over who is recruited to such roles, and in doing so I outline four 
considerations that should shape future debates about the proper level of 
ministerial involvement in senior selection decisions. Finally, I suggest that 
                                                        
11 ,QWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ&RPPLWWHHVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VUROHLQ+LJK&RXUW
selections should be be reviewed after a further three to five years. We are now at the end of that five-
year period: House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n4), para 34. 
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shortlists reconcile the need to more fully involve the Lord Chancellor 
whilst at the same time ensuring that candidates satisfy a merit threshold.  
 
The Lord Chancellor and the JAC-Run Selection Regime 
 
The Constitutional Reform Act ¶WKH$FW·LQVWLWXWHGnew ways of 
selecting judges, replacing the traditionally closed, informal and secretive 
ministerial model focused on the Lord Chancellor with a formal, open and 
inclusive regime DQFKRUHGDURXQGWKH-$&7KH-$&·Vprimary function is 
to recommend people for judicial office in courts and tribunals in England 
and Wales, and to do so via fair and open competitions that are designed 
to elicit evidence that can be weighed against explicit selection criteria. The 
JAC manages a fairly long and structured selection process, which usually 
includes job advertisements, short-listing by tests or paper sifts, interviews 
and, for most posts, presentations or role-play activities.12 It has a heavy 
and variable workload, overseeing the recruitment of between 300 and 800 
judges each year.13 Partly because of this, the JAC is large by comparative 
standards, with 15 Commissioners: seven hold judicial office, one of whom 
is a magistrate, two lawyers and six lay people, one of whom serves as the 
lay chair.14 The Commissioners are recruited through an open competition, 
with the exception of the three senior judicial members, two of whom are 
recruited E\ WKH -XGJHV· &RXQFLO, with the third selected by the Tribunal 
-XGJHV·Council. 
 
This new selection regime is designed to be collaborative;15 that is to say, a 
scheme that recognises that ministers, judges and the legal profession have 
a shared responsibility for³and legitimate interest in³judicial 
appointments. Designed into the JAC-managed selection processes from 
beginning to end is input from multiple actors, and most notably the mix 
of judges, lawyers and lay people who sit on, or are otherwise involved in, 
WKH -$&·V VHOHFWLRQ SURFHVVHV 7KHUH DUH DOVR LPSRUWDQW UROHV IRU VHQLRU
judges such as the Lord Chief -XVWLFH ¶/&-· DQG WKH 6HQLRU 3UHVLGHQW RI
7ULEXQDOV¶637·ZLWKWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORUDOVRLQYROYHGLQZD\VWKDWDUH
outlined below. In this, the JAC-run regime recognises that no one actor 
has a monopoly on all of the information or perspectives necessary to 
reach well-rounded assessments of HLWKHUDSHUVRQ·V suitability for judicial 
office or³more generally³the overall needs of the judicial system as a 
whole. What bears emphasis, for our purposes, is the basic dynamic of this 
                                                        
12 In 2015-WKH-$&·VVHOHFWLRQSURFHVVDYHUDJHGZHHNVZLWKWKHWRWDOHQG-to-end process involving 
VWDJHVRXWVLGHRIWKH-$&·VFRQWUROWDNLQJDQDYHUDJHRIZHHNV-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQ
Annual Report and Accounts: 2015-16 (2016) 11. 
13 See Appendix I in G. Gee and E. Rackley (n5). 
14 See Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013, regs 3-11.  
15 6HH**HH¶-XGLFLDO3ROLF\LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV$1HZ5HJXODWRU\6SDFH·LQ5'HYOLQDQG$
Dodek (eds), Regulating Judges: Beyond Independence and Accountability (Edward Elgar 2016) 145, 153-155. 
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regime: the marginalisation of the Lord Chancellor, with responsibilities 
previously exercised by the Lord Chancellor now hived off to the JAC or 
senior judges such as the LCJ and SPT. Before considering the 
marginalisation of the minister in individual selection decisions, it is 
important to recognize that the Lord Chancellor has an important role in 
shaping policy on appointments, underpinned by continuing ministerial 
responsibility for the selection regime. This includes ensuring that the JAC 
is subject to appropriate governance arrangements and approving its 
strategic objectives.16 Statute also confers on the Lord Chancellor a number 
of specific responsibilities relating to the JAC, such as approving the 
appointment of Commissioners17 and the Chief Executive,18 and laying its 
annual report before Parliament.19 There is a discretionary power enabling 
Lord Chancellors to issue guidance to the JAC, but to date no such 
guidance has been issued.20 Although retaining extensive systemic 
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VLQSXWLQWo individual appointments 
has been emasculated. This marginalisation of the minister is discernible in 
both lower and senior appointments. 
 
Lower Appointments 
 
7KH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·Vmarginalisation is both clearest and most complete 
in respect of lower level court and tribunal appointments. Today, the Lord 
Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the appointment process. The 
Lord &KDQFHOORU·VRQO\ LQYROYHPHQW LVDW WKH very outset. Before the JAC 
advertises a vacancy, the Lord Chancellor is required to consult with the 
LCJ in order to determine the details of the job description.21 All judicial 
vacancies have minimum entry requirements set out in statute. The Lord 
Chancellor, in consultation with the LCJ, can augment these by stipulating 
non-statutory requirements. The power to issue supplementary eligibility 
criteria is significant, insofar as it shapes the pool of eligible candidates for 
a particular judicial vacancy. In practice, however, Lord Chancellors have 
relied on advice from the LCJ and civil servants at Her MDMHVW\·V Courts & 
Tribunals Service. Typical is a requirement that candidates will be 
expected to have experience sitting in a part-WLPH¶IHHSDLG·MXGLFLDOUROHDV
a Recorder, for example). Successive Lord Chancellors, supported by 
senior judges, have regarded experience in a fee paid role as a crucial 
testing ground for those seeking a permanent judicial position. The 
imperative to recruit only those well suited for a judicial career is 
                                                        
16 Ministry of Justice and Judicial Appointments Commission, Framework Document: Ministry of Justice 
and Judicial Appointments Commission (2012) para 3.3. 
17 Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013, regs 9-13. 
18 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 ¶&5$·, Schedule 12, paras 22(2). 
19 CRA, Schedule 12, paras 32(4). 
20 CRA, s65. 
21 CRA, s63. 
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important for several reasons including: the lack of any probation period 
and formal performance review for newly appointed judges; the 
prohibition on returning to practice after holding a permanent judicial 
office; the limited resources available for training new judges; and the 
limited circumstances in which it is permissible to remove sitting judges. 
Requiring fee paid experience, however, limits the pool of eligible 
candidates to the disadvantage of non-traditional candidates. It is not 
always possible, for example, for solicitors in city firms or high street 
practices to undertake a part-time judicial role alongside their day job.  
 
By stipulating non-statutory eligibility requirements the Lord Chancellor 
can exert significant influence on the pool of eligible candidates for specific 
vacancies. Beyond this, however, Lord Chancellors have no role in lower 
level selections. After finalising the job description, the minister drops out 
of the selection process for 95 per cent of judges in England and Wales.22 
The task of identifying the best person for any given vacancy resides with 
the JAC, whilst the final decision whether or not to appoint that person lies 
with the LCJ (for lower courts) or the SPT (for tribunals). It is important to 
note that until 2014 the JAC recommended candidates for all of these 
positions to the Lord Chancellor; in other words, the Lord Chancellor was 
involved at the end as well as the outset of a selection exercise between 
2006 and 2014. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 changed this, substituting 
the LCJ and the SPT in the /RUG &KDQFHOORU·V SODFH DV ILQDO appointing 
authority for lower courts and tribunals respectively.23 Part of the rationale 
for this reform ZDVWKDWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VUROHDVDSSRLQWLQJDXWKRULW\
was widely seen as a rubber stamp.24 Under the 2005 Act, Lord Chancellors 
only had limited scope to do anything other than accept the candidate 
recommended by the JAC³and, in practice, Lord Chancellors almost 
DOZD\V DFFHSWHG WKH -$&·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV25 Over eight years the JAC 
recommended in excess of 4000 candidates for the lower judiciary to four 
different Lord Chancellors, with all but four of the recommendations 
accepted.26 The bureaucratic burden provided a further reason for 
                                                        
22 As of April 2016, there were 3,202 professional judges in the England and Welsh courts. Enjoying the 
final say over appointments to the High Court  (108) and Court of Appeal (44) only means that the Lord 
Chancellor is the appointing authority for around 5 per cent of the professional judiciary in England 
and Wales. For the overall number of professional judges, see Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial 
Office Statistics Bulletin (Published 28 July 2016. Revised 2 December 2016) 6. 
23 See Part 4 of Schedule 13 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, which amended the 2005 Act and the 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
24 See House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n4) paras 29 and 30. 
25 ,WZDVFRPPRQO\VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VLQYROYHPHQWZDVWKHUHIRUHPHDQLQJOHVV1RW
everyone agreed, however. As an official observed, even this minimal level of ministerial input helped 
to HQVXUH WKDW WKH -$&·V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQs ¶DGGHG XS· RQ WKH EDVLV RI HYLGHQFH JDWKHUHG GXULQJ WKH
selection process. 7KH/RUG&KDQFHOORUSHUIRUPHGLQRWKHUZRUGVD¶TXDOLW\FRQWURO·UROH7KLV ¶TXDOLW\
FRQWURO·IXQFWLRQLVQRZVSOLWEHWZHHQWKH/&-DQG637 
26 During his tenure as Lord Chancellor (2007-2010), Jack Straw requested reconsideration of two of the 
-$&·VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRQHRIZKLFKUHODWHGWRDORZHUYDFDQF\DQGDURVH from a lack of clarity about 
the selection criteria. The JAC made³and Straw subsequently accepted³a new recommendation. Ken 
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removing the Lord Chancellor·V UROH: successive office-holders exhibited 
little interest in, and had little time for, the hundreds of lower vacancies 
that are filled each year.27 Compounding the problem was the expansion of 
WKHPLQLVWHU·VSRUWIROLRfollowing the creation of the Ministry of Justice in 
2007, one consequence of which was to twin the office of Lord Chancellor 
with the role of Secretary of State for Justice. The minister now juggles 
responsibility for prisons and probation (as Secretary of State for Justice) 
alongside responsibility for the courts and judiciary (as Lord Chancellor).28 
With a stretched portfolio that embraced the politically sensitive issue of 
prisons, judicial appointments inevitably acquired a lesser importance for 
Lord Chancellors.  
 
The important point is that the already limited role in individual selection 
decisions for lower level appointments envisaged for Lord Chancellors by 
the Constitutional Reform Act was extinguished by the Crime and Courts 
Act 2013. On the one hand, there are good grounds to believe that, as a 
partial consequence of this, there is now too much judicial influence over 
lower level appointments. Judges are involved from the beginning to the 
end of the process of appointing the lower level judiciary. Judges help to 
determine the job descriptions, design the qualifying tests and role-play 
tasks, write references, sit on selection panels, provide views as statutory 
consultees and³following the Crime and Courts Act³now also have the 
final say on whether or not to appoint the candidate recommended by the 
JAC.29 Involving lay people can dilute the levels of judicial influence,30 but 
removing the Lord Chancellor as the final appointing authority eliminates 
a counterweight that could prevent the system slipping into one where the 
judiciary is effectively appointing itself. Among the chief concerns with a 
recruitment process that is dominated by judicial influence is that judges 
may be inclined to appoint people in their own image (i.e. white men from 
the bar).31 On the other hand, the pattern of the Lord Chancellor taking a 
greatly reduced role in lower level appointments pre-dated the 2005 Act. 
For most of the last century judicial appointments were characterised by 
informality, stability and secrecy, but a process of formalisation had began 
in earnest by the mid-1990s for posts below the High Court. This included 
interviews conducted by a panel comprised of an official from the Lord 
&KDQFHOORU·s Department, a judge and a lay person. Decisions whether to 
appoint the candidate who most impressed the panel rested with the Lord 
Chancellor, but the growing size of the professional judiciary meant that 
                                                                                                                                                              
Clarke (2010-2012) rejected three candidates because they did not have the requisite experience for the 
vacancies in question.  
27 See J. Straw, $VSHFWVRI/DZ5HIRUP$Q,QVLGHU·V3HUVSHFWLYH (CUP 2013) 55. 
28 6HHJHQHUDOO\**HH¶:KDWDUH/RUG&KDQFHOORUV)RU"·>@PL 11. 
29 For a discussion, see Gee et al (n2), at 179-182. 
30 For the argument that lay involvement can intensify as well as dilute judicial influence, see Gee, (n4). 
31 G. Bindman and K. Monaghan, Judicial Diversity: Accelerating Change, (Labour Party 2014) para 3.19. 
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Lord Chancellors relied heavily on their officials to consider the details of 
individual appointments. Viewed against this background, removing the 
Lord Chancellor from individual decisions for the lower judiciary under 
the JAC regime is arguably a less dramatic change than might seem to be 
the case at first blush.  
 
Senior Appointments 
 
There are different if overlapping processes for appointments to: the High 
Court; the Court of Appeal; and leadership positions such as the LCJ and 
Heads of Division.32 %XWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VLQYROYHPHQWLVEURDGO\WKH
same for all of them. In each case the Lord Chancellor is involved towards 
the beginning of the selection process. The precise involvement varies. For 
appointments to the High Court, the Lord Chancellor must consult the LCJ 
before requesting the JAC to launch a selection exercise, which is then run 
in substantially similar fashion to lower level competitions.33 For the Court 
of Appeal and leadership positions, the Lord Chancellor must consult the 
LCJ before requesting that the JAC convene a special panel to recommend 
a candidate.34 Statute specifies the membership of these panels and permits 
each panel some latitude to determine its own selection process. However, 
the panel must consult the Lord Chancellor during that process.35 In 2013, 
as part of the competition to appoint the LCJ, the panel met with the then 
Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling, at an early planning stage. The panel was 
reflecting on the requirements of the role of LCJ at the time of the meeting, 
and Graying was able to emphasise the need for the successful candidate 
to have demonstrable leadership and management skills. According to one 
RIWKHSDQHOPHPEHUVWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VEULHILQJZDV¶PRVWLQVWUXFWLYH
DQGKHOSIXO· 
 
In each case, the Lord Chancellor also has the final say over whether or not 
to appoint the candidate recommended by the JAC (for the High Court) or 
the special panels convened by the JAC (for the Court of Appeal, Heads of 
Division and LCJ). The JAC or ad hoc panel, as appropriate, recommends 
one name per vacancy, and must submit a report detailing the recruitment 
process together with any other information that the Lord Chancellor has 
requested. On receiving a recommendation, the Lord Chancellor has three 
options: to accept it, reject it, or to request its reconsideration.36 The latter 
two options can only be exercised once in relation to any specific vacancy. 
After exhausting all of the options in relation to a particular vacancy, the 
Lord Chancellor must accept the last person recommended to them, or any 
                                                        
32 For a summary, see Appendix III in Gee and Rackley (n5). 
33 CRA, s87(2). 
34 CRA, s69(2) and s78(2). 
35 See CRA, s70(2)(A) and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013 reg 6. 
36 See CRA, ss 73, 82 and 90, and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013 regs 8, 14, 20 and 26. 
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person recommended at an earlier stage of the selection exercise so long as 
the Lord Chancellor had not previously rejected that person. Statute also 
stipulates the grounds on which the options to reject a recommendation or 
request its reconsideration are exercisable. The power to reject applies only 
where the Lord Chancellor decides that the recommended candidate is not 
suitable for the vacancy.37 Similarly, the power to request reconsideration 
can be used only where, in the /RUG&KDQFHOORU·Vview, there is insufficient 
evidence that the candidate recommended is suitable for the vacancy, or 
where there is evidence that he or she is not the best candidate on merit.38 
The Lord Chancellor must provide the JAC or ad hoc panel with reasons if 
invoking either option.39 No Lord Chancellor has invoked the option of 
rejecting a recommendation outright. However, in 2010, the then Lord 
Chancellor, Jack Straw, requested that the selection panel reconsider its 
recommendation of Sir Nicholas Wall for the position of President of the 
Family Division. The panel reconsidered its recommendation, but once 
again submitted :DOO·V QDPH, as it was entitled to do under the statute, 
and this was subsequently accepted by Straw.  
 
The Appointment of Sir Nicholas Wall 
 
It is difficult to know for sure what occurred behind closed doors during 
the back-and-IRUWKRQ:DOO·Vappointment, but³drawing on comments on 
the public record together with confidential interviews with some of those 
most intimately involved in this selection³it is possible to piece together 
6WUDZ·VRSSRVLWLRQWR:DOO$bRYHDOO:DOO·VYRFLIHURXVpublic criticism of 
WKH*RYHUQPHQW·VUHIRUPVWRWKHIDPLO\MXVWLFHV\VWHPOHG6WUDZWRGRXEW
:DOO·VFDSDFLW\DQGZLOOLQJQHVVWRRYHUVHHDSrogramme of modernisation. 
Most notably, Wall had criticised the Government for pursuing reforms on 
family justice that appeared ¶WREHGULYHQE\DSRZHUIXOSROLWLFDODJHQGD·
ZLWK ¶QR FOHDU UDWLRQDOH· DQG that ignored the views of the judiciary and 
the legal professions.40 As a result, inside the Ministry, there was ¶DODFNRI
trust about whether Wall FRXOGJHWRQDQGGHOLYHU·WKHUHIRUPVDVa senior 
official put it. This is an entirely appropriate ground for a Lord Chancellor 
to resist the appointment of a senior judicial leader such as President of the 
Family Division. As Straw has noted, Heads RI'LYLVLRQ¶UHTXLUHQRWRQO\
high skills as jurists, but also considerable leadership and administrative 
expertise, and the ability to work effectively with the Ministry, the Courts 
6HUYLFHDQGRWKHURUJDQVRIJRYHUQPHQW·41 Heads of Division work closely 
with officials in the Ministry to develop policy relating to the funding and 
                                                        
37 See CRA, ss74, 75F, 83 and 91, and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013. 
38 See CRA, ss75, 75G, 84 and 92, and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013, regs 9, 15, 21, 27 and 33. 
39 See CRA, ss74(3), 83(3) and 91(3) and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2013, regs 9(3), 15(3), 21(3), 
27(3) and 33(3). 
40 Lord Justice Wall, Justice for Children: Welfare or Farewell? (November 2009) para 51. 
41 J. Straw, $VSHFWVRI/DZ5HIRUP$Q,QVLGHU·V3HUVSHFWLYH (CUP 2013) 56. 
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management of the courts. They must take difficult decisions about how to 
allocate resources and how to address problems of under-performance in 
different parts of the judiciary. Decisions such as these can be unpopular 
with some judges, and a Head of Division must thus be willing to explain 
and defend those decisions to judicial colleagues. As a former Permanent 
Secretary observed, Heads RI'LYLVLRQPXVWH[KLELWERWKWKH¶MXGLFLDOVNLOO
and the MXGLFLDOZLOO·WRUHIRUPWKH justice system. In addition to concerns 
DERXW:DOO·VVXLWDELOLW\IRUWKHrole, Straw also believed that Lady Justice 
Hallett was a better candidate. Though her main expertise lies in criminal 
law rather than family law, Hallett had impressed Straw as one of only a 
handful of senior judges who (according to an insider at the MinLVWU\¶JRW
WKHSRLQWVWUDLJKWDZD\·WKDWWKHMXGLFLDU\KDGWRGRPXFKPRUHWRDGGUHVV
inefficiency within the courts. No doubt also attractive to Straw was the 
fact that there had only been one women appointed as a Head of Division, 
which remains the case as at the time of writing.42 
 
This episode is instructive in illustrating just how little room in practice the 
Lord Chancellor has as the final appointing authority for senior vacancies. 
6WUDZ·VUHDVRQVIRURSSRVLQJWKHVHOHFWLRQDUHSUHFLVHO\WKHVRUWRIgrounds 
envisaged by Parliament. The 2005 Act provides that Lord Chancellors can 
only request reconsideration of a selection where, in his or her view, ¶WKHUH
is not enough evidence that the person is suitable IRUWKHRIILFHFRQFHUQHG· 
(which tallied ZLWK6WUDZ·Vopinion RI:DOORU¶WKHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH
person is not the bHVWFDQGLGDWHRQPHULW·ZKLFKZDs in OLQHZLWK6WUDZ·V
view of Hallett).43 After the selection panel re-VHOHFWHG :DOO DIWHU 6WUDZ·V
initial request for reconsideration, it was still possible for Straw to reject 
Wall. 44 If Straw had rejected Wall at that stage, the panel would have been 
required to select another candidate. In practice, however, Straw felt 
unable to press the issue any further. One reason was the impending 
general election in May 2010. But another reason was the overriding 
imperative for the Lord Chancellor to maintain the confidence of the senior 
judiciary. This was a pressing concern after relations between ministers 
and judges had become strained in 2003 (when, without consultation, the 
Government initiated a series of reforms to the judicial architecture, which 
ultimately culminated in the 2005 Act),45 with a further deterioration in 
2007 (when the Ministry of Justice was created, once again with little 
consultation with the senior judiciary).46  
 
                                                        
42 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss served as President of the Family Division between 1999 and 2005.  
43 CRA, s74(2)(a) and (b). The statute requires either condition to be met. 
44 See CRA, s73. 
45 6HH/RUG:LQGOHVKDP¶7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUP$FW0LQLVWHUV-XGJHVDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
ChangH3DUW·>@3/806; and Lord Windlesham, ¶7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUP$FW7KH3Rlitics 
of Constitutional Reform: 3DUW·>@PL 35. 
46 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government 
(2009-10) HL-30 paras 208-217. 
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Interviews suggest that Straw was concerned that continued opposition to 
the selection would contaminate his relationship with senior judges.47 Wall 
was popular with and highly regarded by other judges, with some officials 
in the Ministry suspecting that some of :DOO·V colleagues were responsible 
for press reports of Straw·VRSSRVLWLRQ during what was supposed to be a 
confidential process. Rumours reached the Ministry that further resistance 
to :DOO·V selection might trigger a judicial review action, although such an 
action was rightly dismissed by officials DV¶DEVROXWHO\SUHSRVWHURXV·DVD
matter of law. Nevertheless, it underscored how poorly judges viewed 
6WUDZ·V UHTXHVW WKDW WKH SDQHO UHFRQVLGHU :DOO·V VHOHFWLRQ. It bears 
HPSKDVLV WKDW LQ UHDFWLQJ VR VWURQJO\ WR 6WUDZ·V UHTXHVW WKH MXGLFLDU\
demonstrated little respect for the legitimate interest that ministers have in 
judicial appointments. It is possible that some judges thought that for the 
minister to resist the promotion of a serving judge on the basis that he was 
XQVXLWDEOHIRUWKHRIILFHFRQFHUQHGZDV¶WDQWDPRXQWWRDEUHDFKRIUHVSHFW
for judicial independence because of what such a rejection would imply 
about the track record of the judge·.48 Any such view would be mistaken, 
however. It involves no disrespect for judicial independence for a minister 
(or anyone else for that matter) to have good reasons to believe that an 
otherwise excellent jurist is ill-suited for a specific leadership role.49  
 
The point is that the Lord Chancellor felt unable to force the matter lest 
this undermine his relationship with the senior judiciary, and by extension 
compromise the wider programme of modernisation that the Ministry was 
developing with judicial input. As a former occupant of the office noted, 
¶QRRQHDSSRLQWHG/RUG&KDQFHOORUZRXOGODVWILYHPLQXWHVLIWKH\ORVWWKH
FRQILGHQFHRIWKHVHQLRUMXGLFLDU\· In a similar vein, another former Lord 
Chancellor stressed that it was the fear of ¶disapproval·IURPsenior judges 
that explained why he always accepted the names recommended to him. 
Inside the Ministry this episode cemented a feeling among some (but not 
all) officials that the new selection regime was unbalanced, with Straw said 
to view the recruitment pURFHVVDV¶tilted in favour of the senior judiciary·. 
Under the 2005 Act Parliament intended a collaborative approach to senior 
vacancies, with Lord Chancellors supposed to enjoy a real discretion over 
                                                        
47 $PRQJVW6WUDZ·VSROLF\SULRULWLHVZKHQDSSRLQWHG/RUG&KDQFHOORULQZDV¶WRUHSDLUIHQFHVZLWK
WKHMXGLFLDU\·J. Straw, Last Man Standing (MacMillan 2013) 498. 
48 -YDQ=\O6PLW¶-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWVLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV6LQFHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUP$FW
·LQH. Corder and J. van Zyl Smit (eds), Securing Judicial Independence: The Role of Commissions in 
Selecting Judges in the Commonwealth (Siber Ink forthcoming). 
49 ,WPLJKWEHDUJXHGWKDW6WUDZ·VUHOXFWDQFH WRSURPRWHVXFKDQRXWVSRNHQFULWLFDV:DOOPLJKWFKLOO
MXGJHV·ZLOOLQJQHVVWRSXEOLFL]HWKHLUFRQFHUQV,GRQRWKDYHPXFKV\PSDWK\IRUWKLVDUJXPHQWDWOHDVW
as applied to Wall. The speech by Wall that caused so much consternation inside the Ministry was not 
expressed in the measured terms suitable for a judge entering the arena of public policy, and thus failed 
to exhibit the comity owed to the executive. Other avenues were open to Wall to articulate his concerns 
(e.g. to discuss them with the President of the Family Division, who could then raise these with officials 
at the Ministry). Arguably, Wall failed to exhibit the small-S¶SROLWLFDO·VNLOOVDQGMXGJPHQWUHTXLUHGRI
judicial leaders. 
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whether to accept the candidates recommended by a panel, albeit that the 
PLQLVWHU·Vability to reject or request reconsideration of a name could only 
be exercised for limited reasons. This discretion was not supposed to be 
illusory, but in practice is rendered nugatory by the overwhelming need 
for the Lord Chancellor to maintain the confidence of the senior judiciary. 
1RWRQO\LVWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·V involvement much more marginal than 
Parliament intended, it also represents a considerable change. The gradual 
formalisation of selections for the lower judiciary underway by the 1990s 
did not extend to senior posts. 7KRXJK SODFLQJ ZHLJKW RQ WKH MXGJHV·
YLHZV WKH /RUG &KDQFHOORU·V GLVFUHWLRQ ZDV ODUJHO\ untrammeled. Lord 
Chancellors DOZD\VUHWDLQHG¶WKHFRQWUROOLQJKDQG·DVDIRUPHUofficial put 
it, displaying little qualm at selecting VRPHRQH RWKHU WKDQ WKH MXGJHV·
preferred candidate.50 If the pre-2005 regime was lopsided by conferring 
too much discretion on the Lord Chancellor, the current regime goes much 
too far in the other direction by denying the minister a real say in senior 
selections. 
 
The Case for Reform 
 
I now want to make the case for why Lord Chancellors³expertly advised 
by their officials and accountable to Parliament³should possess a real say 
over individual selections to senior vacancies. Four main considerations 
underpin this case for reform. First, the executive has a legitimate interest 
in the attributes of the individuals who fill senior roles, and the selection 
regime should (but currently does not) give adequate expression to this. 
Ministers are rightly concerned to ensure that the individuals recruited for 
judicial office have the appropriate skill-set. This is true of all judicial roles, 
but has a special relevance for leadership roles (where judges work closely 
with ministers and officials on the funding, management and reform of the 
justice system) and the higher courts (where judges often enjoy significant 
powers over public policy). It is appropriate for Lord Chancellors to have a 
real say over individual selection decisions given that they must account to 
3DUOLDPHQWIRUWKHDSSRLQWPHQWVUHJLPHDVSDUWRIWKHRIILFH·VRYHUDUFKLQJ
duty to ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the 
work of the courts.51 The current arrangements are lopsided in making the 
Lord Chancellor responsible for the appointments regime as a whole, but 
without conferring on them an adequate say over individual appointment 
decisions.  
 
Second, the Lord Chancellor is not only capable of arriving at an informed 
DVVHVVPHQWRIDFDQGLGDWH·VVXLWDELOLW\IRUMXGLFLDORIILFHEXWFDQFRQWULEXWH
                                                        
50 See generally J. Rozenberg, Trial of Strength: A Battle Between Ministers and Judges Over Who Makes the 
Law (Richard Cohen 1997) 13-17. 
51 See s1 Courts Act 2003. 
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something important and distinct to the overall process of selecting senior 
judges. The claim that a minister is capable of making an intelligent and 
informed evalXDWLRQRIWKLVRUWKDWSHUVRQ·VVXLWDELOLW\IRUDVHQLRUMXGLFLDO
position ought not to be contentious. Lay people are involved, after all, on 
the panels that recommend a candidate for appointment to the High Court 
and above. Similarly, the claim that the Lord Chancellor, as a minister and 
politician, can contribute something important to the process of recruiting 
individual judges should be equally uncontroversial. The selection regime 
recognises, after all, that different stakeholders make distinct contributions 
to the appointment process (judges and lawyers, for example, are uniquely 
well placed not only WRHYDOXDWHDFDQGLGDWH·VVNLOOVRI OHJDODQDO\VLVbut 
also to bring first-hand knowledge of the demands of judicial office, whilst 
lay people instill fresh perspectives and the latest human resources know-
how). Ministerial involvement can inject a substantial degree of democratic 
legitimacy and accountability into the selection regime³and, by extension, 
into the judiciary as an institution of government. Involving a minister in 
individual appointment decisions ensures that the executive has a genuine 
VWDNH LQ DQG UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH VHOHFWLRQV UHJLPH DQG ·FDQQRW HQWLUHO\
ZDVKWKHLUKDQGVRIZKDWLVKDSSHQLQJ·52 It also means that senior judges 
can partO\JURXQGWKHLUDXWKRULW\RQWKHH[HFXWLYH·VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHLU
selection.  
 
Third, there are several reasons to suspect that ministerial involvement can 
furnish the political pressure necessary to advance the diversity agenda. 
As a politician who is likely to view the judiciary in its larger political and 
social contexts, the Lord Chancellor is well positioned to grasp the critical 
importance of the highest judicial ranks appearing much more reflective of 
society at large. Electoral incentives might encourage Lord Chancellors to 
prioritise judicial diversity (although it is also true that popular concern 
about diversity might not be evenly distributed throughout the electorate, 
and as such politicians might have an unreliable focus on it).53 In addition, 
the Lord Chancellor, the LCJ and the JAC are each under a statutory duty 
with regard to diversity, but Parliament is able to hold a Lord Chancellor 
to account for the failure to make progress in ways much less true of the 
JAC or the LCJ.54 These reasons resonate with experiences in some other 
FRPPRQODZFRXQWULHVZKHUH¶SROLWLFDOOHDGHUVKLS·is cited as amongst the 
most important factors in bringing about change in the composition of the 
judiciary.55 :KDW&KHU\O7KRPDVWHUPV¶WKHOHDGHUVKLSIDFWRU·56 takes many 
                                                        
52 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments Process: Oral and Written 
Evidence, p135, Lord Woolf, Q285. 
53 $/\QFK¶'LYHUVLW\:LWKRXWD-XGLFLDO$SSRLQWPHQWV&RPPLVVLRQ³The AustraliDQ([SHULHQFH·LQ
Gee and Rackley (n5) 111. 
54 See CRA, s137A.  
55 C. Thomas, Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other Jurisdictions A Review of Research, Policies 
and Practices (The Commission for Judicial Appointments 2005) 114 
56 Ibid at 114. 
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forms, including using the ability to shape general policies to encourage or 
even to require other stakeholders in the selection process to make quicker 
and more visible progress on diversifying the senior judiciary. The current 
arrangements in England and Wales assume that it suffices for the Lord 
Chancellor to deliver political leadership on diversity by making policy for 
the selection regime as a whole (although in practice the ability of any one 
minister to champion bold policy changes on diversity is hampered by the 
cautious attitude of the judiciary, which in turn has led the JAC to be risk-
averse during much of its first decade).57 However, it seems reasonable to 
surmise that DORQJVLGHXVLQJWKHRIILFH·VV\VWHPLFUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRDJLWDWH 
for faster progress, the /RUG&KDQFHOORU·Vdirect involvement in individual 
selection decisions could form an important element of a successful policy 
response to the diversity deficit. Differently put: by marginalising the Lord 
Chancellor from appointment decisions, the current arrangements have 
not adequately capitalised on the role that political leadership could play 
in promoting diversity. 
 
Fourth, there are also several reasons to suppose that an enhanced role for 
Lord Chancellors in senior appointments can promote and protect judicial 
independence. To flourish, judicial independence requires, perhaps above 
all else, a political class that recognises the stake that political actors share 
in a system of independent courts that delivers socially, economically and 
politically desirable goals. This broad-based political support for judicial 
independence must be sufficiently strong to withstand the inevitable but 
sporadic tensions that will occur from time to time between politicians and 
judges. Critical to the PDLQWHQDQFHRID¶SROLWLFDOO\HIIHFWLYHFRQVWLWXHQF\·58 
for judicial independence is an informed and engaged executive that has a 
firm grasp of its responsibility to ensure that independent judges are able 
to discharge their constitutional function. Viewed in this light, meaningful 
involvement for the Lord Chancellor in the appointment process can help 
WRIRVWHUWKHH[HFXWLYH·VWUXVWDQGFRQILGHQFHLQWKHMXVWLFHV\VWHP. It does 
so by reassuring ministers as to the quality of the individuals selected and, 
more generally, the rigour of the process by which those individuals were 
recruited. Allowing Lord Chancellors to participate in selections decisions 
as an engaged and informed partner can also help to buttress ministerial 
understanding of the roles performed by the judiciary. Together, this 
should make it more likely that Lord Chancellors take VHULRXVO\WKHRIILFH·V
responsibilities for the justice system, including the statutory duty to have 
regard to the need to defend judicial independence.59  
 
                                                        
57 6HHJHQHUDOO\**HHDQG(5DFNOH\¶,QWURGXFWLRQ'LYHUVLW\DQGWKH-$&·V)LUVW7HQ<HDUV·LQGee 
and Rackley (n5) 1. 
58 6+ROPHV¶-XGLFLDO,QGHSHQGHQFHDV$PELJXRXV5HDOLW\DQG,QVLGLRXV,OOXVLRQ·LQ5'ZRUNLQHG
From Liberal Values to Democratic Transition: Essays in Honour of János Kis (CEU Press 2004) 3, 11.  
59 CRA, s3(6). 
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To date, the scope for an increased role for Lord Chancellors in individual 
selection decisions to lead to the sort of effective political engagement that 
strengthens judicial independence has not been widely acknowledged. On 
the contrary, most judges and lawyers have argued precisely the opposite: 
DQHQKDQFHGUROHULVNV¶SROLWLFLsLQJ·DSSRLQWPHQWVDQGhence endangering 
judicial independence. Seldom is it spelt out what precisely is meant by 
¶SROLWLFLsDWLRQ·LQWKLVFRQWH[W60 but presumably this catchword is intended 
to denote the improper intrusion of party politics or political ideology in 
the selection of individual candidates for judicial office.61 It is equally rare 
for evidence to be furnished that suggests that this risk of politicisation is 
well grounded. Since the Second World War, partisan considerations have 
been almost entirely absent: even when exercising effectively untramelled 
discretion prior to 2005, successive Lord Chancellors had eschewed party 
politics when appointing people to even the highest judicial offices.62 Past 
is not prologue, of course. Circumstances have changed in both the 
political and legal realms, and continue to change. For a start, the office of 
Lord Chancellor is now a conventional cabinet post, with its occupant no 
longer required to be either a politician with fairly substantial experience 
in legal practice or a lawyer who shares the political sympathies of the 
government of the day.63 It follows that the Prime Minister can now 
appoint someone as Lord Chancellor who knows little or nothing of the 
law or the judiciary. More generally, the spectre of judicial power looms 
larger today than at any point in the last fifty years following the 
expansion of judicial review and the enactment of the Human Rights Act. 
It is possible that domestic courts will occupy an even more central place 
on the constitutional stage following WKH 8.·V ZLWKGUDZDO IURP WKH
European Union, which might in turn entail more frequent and turbulent 
clashes between the executive and the judiciary. For most in the legal 
community, then, the worry is that the politicians who now occupy the job 
of Lord Chancellor might be tempted ³if confronted by more assertive 
domestic courts³to misuse an enlarged role in senior selection decisions, 
with judicial independence eroding as a result. 
 
At one level, such concerns are understandable. Judges and lawyers are 
rightly anxious to avoid any threats to judicial independence. However, at 
DQRWKHU OHYHOFRQFHUQVDERXW WKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·V LQSXW LQWR LQGLYLGXDO
                                                        
60 See e.g. House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n4) para 26. 
61 6HHJHQHUDOO\**HH¶7KH3HUVLVWHQW3ROLWLFLVRI-XGLFLDO6HOHFWLRQ$&RPSDUDWLYH$QDO\VLV·LQ$
Seibert-Fohr (eds), Judicail Independence in Transition (Springer 2012) 121. 
62 At the time of the 2005 reforms there was widespread agreement among politicians, judges, lawyers 
and academics WKDWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VSRZHUWRDSSRLQWHGMXGJHVKDGQRWEHHQDEXVHG¶LQPRGHUQ
WLPHV·ZKLFKZDVFRPPRQO\XQGHUVWRRGWRPHDQVLQFHWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU6HH'HSDUWPHQWIRU
Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: A New Way of Appointing Judges (2003) C 10/03, para 22. For 
the most detailed academic GLVFXVVLRQRIWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VSDWURQDJHSRZHUVVHH:RRGKRXVH(n1) 
138-142. 
63 See CRA, s2. 
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appointments tend to treat politicians as relevant to judicial independence 
only to the extent that judges must always remain above the political fray 
in order to supply an effective check upon political actors. This reflects a 
common but one-sided understanding of judicial independence. It is one²
sided insofar as it concentrates only on the role that independent courts 
play in checking political power, neglecting the important ways in which 
independent courts facilitate such power by, for example, stabilising policy 
outcomes and reducing policy uncertainty. Not only is this account of 
judicial independence one-sided, it is excessively negative as well, insofar 
as it focuses only on the tensions that inevitably surface between judges 
and politicians from time to time. It places too little weight on the ways 
that informed and engaged politicians can promote judicial independence. 
It is true that because judicial rulings in politically contentious cases risk 
political unpopularity it is necessary to insulate the judiciary against 
certain political forces. However, this should always be a matter of degree: 
insulating judges from the pressures and temptations of ordinary political 
life does not mean isolating them from all political forces. The dominant 
but erroneous view within the legal community is that judicial 
independence requires that the judges themselves, tempered only by the 
involvement of lay people on the JAC or ad hoc selection panels, should 
have the decisive say in the appointment of other judges, with ministers 
having little or no role in individual selection decisions. It is this view that 
is reflected in the current selection regime³but the current arrangements 
go too far in excluding ministers from individual appointment decisions. It 
is with this in mind that I want to make the case for shortlists.  
 
The Case for Shortlists 
 
Under the current arrangements the Lord Chancellor receives only a single 
recommendation for each senior vacancy. This not only denies the minister 
any real choice, but also assumes too simplistic an understanding of merit 
LQVRIDUDVLWVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHUHZLOODOZD\VEHRQH¶EHVW·FDQGLGDWHIRUHDFK
and every senior vacancy. It seems likely that from time to time the Lord 
Chancellor may come to a different conclusion than the JAC or the ad hoc 
selection panel about the exact balance of skills and experiences required 
for a specific senior vacancy. This might, in turn, lead the Lord Chancellor 
to reach a different conclusion from the recommending panel about which 
from a handful of candidates is the strongest person to fill a particular job. 
Reflecting this, the JAC (for the High Court) and the ad hoc selection panel 
(for the Court of Appeal and leadership jobs) should be required to present 
the Lord Chancellor with a shortlist of between three and five names per 
vacancy. The Lord Chancellor would be free to select from that shortlist. In 
deciding whom to choose, the Lord Chancellor would be required to base 
their choice on the explicitly stated selection criteria, which should include 
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scope to select a candidate that would contribute to the diversification of 
the senior judiciary.  
 
This represents a sensible H[SDQVLRQRIWKHPLQLVWHU·VLQSXWE\LQWURGXFLQJ
an element of choice, but while ensuring that the JAC or selection panel (as 
appropriate) can first vet all of the candidates that are ultimately included 
on the shortlist. The workload associated with selecting from a shortlist for 
the relatively small number of senior vacancies that arise each year should 
not be overly burdensome for the Lord Chancellor, recognising that the 
officeholder has to manage a large ministerial portfolio. Using shortlists is 
also consistent with the approach in several other common law countries.64 
Contrary to what some have suggested,65 it is also broadly in line with the 
current selection regime, insofar as no one can be appointed without first 
having first received the endorsement of the JAC or an ad hoc selection 
panel. The fact that the JAC or selection panel will ensure that all of the 
names on the shortlist satisfy the merit threshold all but eliminates the 
scope for partisan considerations to enter the /RUG&KDQFHOORU·VFKRLFH,Q
this, shortlists are consistent with the principle of appointment on merit. 
Empowering the Lord Chancellor to select from a shortlist augments the 
ministerial role, but it is still a bounded discretion if statute stipulates both 
the minimum and maximum names to be included on the shortlist, with 
the Lord Chancellor required to exercise his or her discretion on the basis 
of merit. (Shortlists of a specified number of names is preferable to the JAC 
or ad hoc selection panel being required to forward the names of all of the 
candidates who meet the selection criteria). Using shortlists is consistent 
with judicial independence insofar as it introduces a limited discretion that 
recognises WKHH[HFXWLYH·V OHJLtimate interest in appointments. Over time, 
using shortlists should help to cultivate Lord Chancellors as informed and 
engaged partners in the judicial selection regime. One possibility to further 
VWUXFWXUHWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VGLVFUHWLRQZRXOGEHWRUHTXLUHWKH-$&RU
selection panel to rank the candidates on the shortlist. The Lord Chancellor 
would be free to depart from the SDQHO·Vranking, but would be required to 
supply reasons for doing so. The risk with a ranked shortlist, however, is 
that it would in practice undercut the element of choice for the minister 
that shortlists introduce. More attractive would be to include a diversity 
component on the shortlist. The JAC or selection panel would be required 
to include at least one candidate from an under-represented group on the 
                                                        
64 The processes differ of course, but shortlists prepared by a nominating commission feature in some 
appointment processes in Canada, Ireland and South Africa as well as in some states in the United 
States. See J. van Zyl Smith, The Appointment, Tenure and Removal of Judges under Commonwealth 
Principles: A Compendium and Analysis of Best Practice (BICCL 2015) Appendix 2. 
65 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments Process: Oral and Written 
Evidence, p450 (Lord Mance). 
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shortlist, with a duty to offer an explanation where this was not possible 
(because, for example, of the size and composition of the eligible pool).66  
 
Some might suggest that presenting the Lord Chancellor with a shortlist is 
appropriate for the Court of Appeal and leadership posts, but not for the 
High Court. I disagree: to my mind, recruitment to the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal should be treated in essentially the same manner, with the 
Lord Chancellor having a legitimate interest in appointments to each of the 
two courts. There are a number of good reasons to treat recruitment to the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal in the same way. For a start, there are 
several similarities between the two courts: both are superior courts of 
record. Their judges enjoy the same constitutional protection under the Act 
of Settlement against removal. Both courts are also a site of judicial review 
claims against the government and public authorities, and therefore serve 
important constitutional functions. Most importantly for these purposes is 
the fact that recruitment to the Court of Appeal has been exclusively from 
among existing members of the judiciary in recent years. Appointment to 
the High Court is thus a critical gateway to the top ranks of the judiciary. 
Opening up recruitment to the High Court bench to candidates from non-
traditional social and professional backgrounds is necessary as a way of 
promoting judicial diversity in the Court of Appeal and the UK Supreme 
Court. For this reason, shortlists should apply to the High Court as well as 
to the Court of Appeal and leadership positions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The judicial appointments regime in England and Wales is unbalanced. If 
the pre-2005 regime conferred excessive discretion on the Lord Chancellor, 
the new regime has gone much too far in the opposite direction. Today, the 
Lord Chancellor is almost entirely excluded from the process of selecting 
lower level judges, save for a limited role at the outset of a selection round. 
The Lord Chancellor has the final say whether or not to appoint those who 
the JAC or ad hoc selection panel recommends for senior vacancies. But, in 
WUXWKWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU·VRSWLRQVDUHVROLPLWHGDVWREHDOPRVWLOOXVRU\
The current arrangements place far too little weight on the sound reasons 
for involving Lord Chancellors in individual selection decisions, including 
the scope for ministerial input to enhance judicial independence, to supply 
political leadership on judicial diversity and to render more effective the 
/RUG&KDQFHOORULQWKHGLVFKDUJHRIWKHRIILFH·VV\VWHPLFUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRU
                                                        
66 A diversity component is not unfamiliar to ECtHR of Human Rights, the UK Government must 
submit to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe a three-person shortlist that includes at 
least one woman. See Article 22 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For a discussion of the 
use of short-OLVWV LQVHYHUDO(&+5FRQWUDFWLQJSDUWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH8.VHH./HPPHQV ¶(S)electing 
Judges for StrasERXUJ$'LVDSSRLQWLQJ3URFHVV"·LQ0%REHNHG6HOHFWLQJ(XURSH·V-XGJHV$&ULWLFDO
Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (OUP 2015) 94. 
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the justice system as a whole. In this article, I have argued that presenting 
the Lord Chancellor with a shortlist of candidates from which to choose 
for senior vacancies could enhance judicial independence and diversity, 
but whilst preserving the principle of appointment on merit. The changes 
for which I argue in this article would require statutory change. But, above 
all, they require a cultural change within the legal community. Judges and 
lawyers need to acknowledge not only the valuable contribution that the 
Lord Chancellor can make in individual selection decisions, but also the 
vital importance of effective political engagement with the justice system 
as the foundation of judicial independence. To endure despite occasional 
but inevitable tensions that arise between the executive and the judiciary, 
judicial independence requires constant constructive engagement between 
ministers, judges and civil servants on a wide range of issues relating to 
the administration of justice, including appointments. Or differently put: 
the appointments regime can help to bridge the gulf between the political 
and legal realms, but only if the Lord Chancellor has a meaningful input 
into senior selection decisions. 
 
